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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NICOLE H. CODE, F.K.A. NICOLE L. HANDRAHAN, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND 
BUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Brief of Defendants/Respondents 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision in this action on March 23,2006. Code 
v. Utah Dep't of Health. 2006 UT App 113, 133 P.3d 438. A timely petition for certiorari 
was filed by Plaintiff. This Court granted that petition, limited to one question: "Whether 
the court of appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in this case." 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
(West 2004). 
Issue Presented 
Final Order 
Under established precedent, a district court order is a final, appealable order if it 
determines substantial rights of the parties and finally terminates the litigation, leaving 
nothing more to be done. The district court's memorandum decision granted the State's 
motion to dismiss and dismissed Code's claim without inviting any further action. Did 
the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the memorandum decision was a final, 
appealable order from which Code's time to appeal ran? 
A. Standard of Review 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness. Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration. 944 P.2d 346,350 (Utah 1997). 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
The following provisions are attached in the Addendum to this Brief: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7 
2 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a district court proceeding. 
2. Course of the Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff Nicole Code filed this wrongful termination action against Utah's 
Department of Health and the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind (collectively "State"). 
R. 55-59. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted in a 
memorandum decision entered January 10,2005. R. 69-73. The memorandum decision 
did not leave anything further to be done. It was signed by the district court judge and 
stated that "[f]6r the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim." R. 72. 
The memorandum decision was mailed to both counsel on the day it was entered. R. 73. 
On February 23,2005, Code filed with the district court a proposed order of 
dismissal. R. 74-75. She had not been requested by the court to prepare any such 
document. On February 25,2005, the district court signed Code's proposed order of 
dismissal. R. 74-75. Code's notice of appeal was filed on March 8,2005. R. 76-78. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed Code's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding 
that the district court's memorandum decision was a final, appealable order and the notice 
of appeal had not been filed within 30 days of that order. 2006 UT App 113,133 P.3d 
3 
438. Code timely filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. This Court granted the 
petition, limited to the following question: "Whether the Court of Appeals lacked 
appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in this case." 
3. Disposition Below 
By a published memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
Summary of the Argument 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied its own and this Court's precedent in 
concluding that, because the district court's memorandum decision determined the 
substantial rights of the parties and finally terminated the litigation, leaving nothing 
further to be done, it was a final, appealable order and Code's time to appeal ran from the 
entry of that order. And because the subsequent order submitted by Code did not change 
the substantive rights of the parties, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the 
second order did not restart the time to appeal. Thus, the notice of appeal was untimely 
because it was not filed within 30 days of the district court's memorandum decision, and 
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
Code's notice of appeal was untimely because It was not filed 
within 30 days of the district court's memorandum decision -
which was a final, appealable judgment that determined the 
substantial rights of the parties and terminated the litigation, 
leaving nothing further to be done 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied its own and this Court's precedent in 
determining that the district court's memorandum decision was a final, appealable order, 
from which Code's time to appeal ran. 
Pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a]n appeal may 
be taken from a district... court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal 
from all final orders and judgments." "[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from." Utah R.-App. P. 4(a). The district court entered its signed 
memorandum decision on Monday, January 10,2005. Code's notice of appeal should 
have been filed no later than Wednesday, February 9,2005. Because the notice of appeal 
was filed late, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal. 
In deciding whether a particular order or memorandum decision is a final order, 
this Court looks to the substance of the document: 
A final order or judgment must dispose of the case as to all the 
parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the 
5 
merits of the case. In other words, to be a final judgment, the order must 
end the controversy between the litigants. 
Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6, f23,44 P.3d 663 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). See also Swenson Assoc. Architects v. State. 889 P.2d 415,417 
(Utah 1994) (signed minute entry can be a final judgment where "the ruling specifies with 
certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of 
enforcement."); Harris v. IES Assocs.. Inc.. 2003 UT App 112,1(56, 69 P.3d 297 
(acknowledging Utah Supreme Court precedent that order is final if it determines 
substantial rights and finally terminates the litigation). 
The district court's memorandum decision here meets the criteria for a final 
judgment. It dismissed Code's claim entirely, decisively ending the controversy. It is 
susceptible of enforcement. It did not leave anything more to be done,, Unlike the signed 
minute entry in Swenson.1 the memorandum decision does not contain language showing 
an intent that a separate, further, order be entered. Code fails to cite any language in the 
memorandum decision itself which would call into question its finality. 
Code failed to file her notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the 
memorandum decision. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives an appellate 
1
 In Swenson. the signed minute entry expressly instructed the defendants' counsel 
to prepare a final order. The Court ruled that such a minute entry could not be a final 
order where its very wording called for a separate order to be prepared. Swenson. 889 
P.2dat417. 
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court of jurisdiction. Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs. of Utah. Inc.. 2000 UT 48, f 5, 
2 P.3d 447. See also Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952,955 
(Utah 1984) ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is 
a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal."). The Court of Appeals 
properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely filed. 
The Court of Appeals also correctly applied its own precedent to determine that the 
subsequent order of February 25th did not reset Code's time for appeal because the 
second order did not alter the substantive rights decided by the memorandum decision. 
See Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App 405,1fl8, 82 P.2d 191 ("Where a judgment is 
reentered, and the subsequent judgment does not alter the substantive rights affected by 
the first judgment, the time for appeal runs from the first judgment.") (internal quotations 
and citation omitted), cert denied. 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). Code does not dispute that 
the second order failed to alter substantive rights decided by the memorandum decision, 
only that the memorandum decision could not have constituted a final order due to a 
presumption against finality in Rule 7(f)(2). 
But Rule 7(f)(2) contains no presumption against finality. It simply does not 
address what happens when a prevailing party does not submit a further order. Faced 
with a rule that did not address her situation, Code reasonably should have turned to case 
law to fill in the gap. And, based on the clear definition of finality in case law, Code 
should have preserved her right to appeal by filing her notice of appeal within 30 days of 
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the memorandum decision rather than dilatorily filing her proposed order after that time 
had run.2 Instead she advances an interpretation of the rule which allows her to 
circumvent her duty to file a timely notice of appeal and relieves her of her duty to review 
case law. Even Judge McHugh, despite her sympathy for the confusion created by the 
rule, did not dissent from the majority, but agreed that under "clear precedent" the 
memorandum decision was a final order. Code at fflf 11. Code fails to explain why, given 
this clear precedent, she was justified in relying on the language of Rule 7(f)(2) alone. 
At best, Code's argument may support an amendment of Rule 7(f)(2) to fill in this 
gap, not reversal of the precedent that has filled that gap up to now. See Laney v. 
Fairview Citv. 2002 UT 79, 1f 45, 57 P.3d 1007 (noting the "substantial burden of 
persuasion" on a party seeking to overturn precedent in demonstrating that prior case law 
"is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will 
come by departing from precedent"). Precisely what form that amendment would take is 
for this Court to decide, but any such amendment would not relieve Code of her 
responsibility to apply precedent and timely file a notice of appeal. 
Code's reliance on Rule 7(f)(2) is further misplaced because, as held by the Court 
of Appeals, the clear directive from the district court in dismissing the case brought the 
2Code incorrectly asserts that such a cautionary approach would have been 
ineffective and premature. But under Utah R. App. P. 4, a notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision but before entry of judgment would have been treated as 
properly filed since no tolling motions were filed in this case. 
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memorandum decision within the "unless otherwise directed" exception to Rule 7(f)(2). 
Rule 7(f)(2) provides that a further order need not be submitted if "otherwise directed by 
the court." After analyzing the merits of Code's claim, the district court ordered: "For the 
reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim." R. 72. The unambiguous 
dismissal here, without invitation to submit further order, left nothing more to be done. 
By explicitly dismissing the case, the district court implicitly directed that no further order 
was required. 
CONCLUSION 
Code has failed to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals's finality analysis was 
incorrect. Because the district court's memorandum decision determined the substantial 
rights of the parties and finally terminated the litigation, it was a final, appealable order 
under established Utah appellate case law. With entry of that final order, Code's appeal 
time began to run and her notice of appeal, filed more than thirty days later, was untimely. 
And because the subsequent order submitted by Code did not change the substantive 
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rights of the parties, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the second order did 
not restart the time to appeal. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that 
it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
Dated this 2^ "Hay of September, 2006. 
J/CLIFFOR^PETERSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS to the following this ^ ^ 4 a y of September, 2006: 
BRAD C. SMITH (6656) 
BENJAMIN C. RASMUSSEN (9462) 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 6 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Note 20 
stonv. LeWis, 1901^818 P.2d 531. Appeal And rules*6(b), 73(a), 75(a)? Nti&ley v. Stati'Katz 
Error ^ 9 4 9 Real Estate, Inc., 1964; 15 Utah -2d 126, 388 
A&nittirig administrate record, 3f zoning P/2d798. Appeal And Frrt& $=* 607(2) 
procedure at time of trial1 was\vithfo discretion '" Attorney filing ^notice trf appeal is charg&& 
of trial court, absent showing that-party lacked with knowledge of when{ cfe&Hgnation!, of recofii 
actual notice and time to prepare to meet ques- ori^  appeal should be filed and if during period 
tionS raised by admitted documents. Rules Cfv. before filing time, he is ^aware of reason for 
Proc., Rule 6(d). * Saricry, City \l Salt Lake 6oun-t delay, lie is not entitTe4 to_ ignore "lime,, period 
ty, 1990^794 V2d 4 8 ^ certiorari grafted 804 and later claim excusable nieglect without filing 
P.2d 1232, reversed in'part ?27 P.2d 2r£. Zon- for extension of time. Rules of Civil
 JProcqdure> 
ing And Planning fe» 643 * rules 6(b), 73(a), 75(a). Nunley, yrKStan Katz 
Where party filed notice of appeal from deci- Real Estate, Inc.,, i964, 15 Ut^£4Vl£*» 38£ 
sion pfjjransporta^on Commission within 30 P.2d>79$. Appeal And Error <&> 607(2) 
days,, of notice of decision, such appeal was Where petition was denied by formal findings 
timely even though E$jt filed within 30 days of fact, conclusions of law and order dated and 
from date on the decision. Rules of Civil Proce- filed February 23, and notice of appeal was not 
dure, rules 6(a, e)> 81(d); U.C.A.1953, presented to clerk of district court for' filing 
27-12-13^9. Reagan putdoor Advertising, Inq. until; March 24^althouigh served on opponent's 
v. UtahJDept. of Transp., 1979, 589 P.2d 782. counsel on March 23, > notice was-not timely 
Highways «» 95.1 filed and* appeal was dismissed. Rules of'Civil 
Plaintiffs cause was not prejudiced by two- Procedure, rules 6(b), 58A(c) 60(bMsl), 73(a)* 
day notice of hearingifor release jog attached Andersons. Anderson, 1955, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 
property, where claimed, prejudice j#» plaintiff P-2d 845. ' Time <&=> 5; Appeal And Error ^ » 
did not involve inadequacy of time^to»prepare 428(2) 
for. hearing but njerejy reflected concern over Rule rjrovidin^ that time within which" an 
consequences of releasing attached property. appeal may be taker/ may fa» Extended on show-
Rules ^f Civil Procedure, rules 6(d), 64C(f), mg of excusable1'neglect based on failure of a 
Jensen v. Eames, 1974, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 party to learn of entry of judgment prescribes 
P.2d23£. Appeal And Error @=> 1043(3) only circumstance under which court mayex-
That defendants' counsel entered case about tend time for filing notice*of appeal; and other 
date that notice of appeal was filed and desired rules granting <i>ower to extend time for failure 
to i read transcript before filing designation of to act if due to excusable neglect apply only 
record <m appeal was not excusable neglect where Notice "of appeal has been fileTd in time, 
justifying allowing of appeal after he failed to Rules of Civil Procedure/ rule's -6(b), 58A(c), 
timely file designation where'he was available 60(b), <l)f 73(a) Anderson v/Anderson, 1955,3 
to request additional time to serve designation Utah 2d277, 282 P.2d 845. Appeal' And Error 
but failed, to do so. Rules' of Civil Procedure, &=> 430(2) 
PART III. ?£EADINGS, MOTIONS; ANlD ORDERS 
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS* MEMORANDA, HEAR 
INGS, ORDERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDEijL 
(a) Pleading^. There shall be a complaint and; an answer* a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer tb a cross d&im^if Ihe answer" contains a cross claim'; 
a third party complaint, if a person who \y£S not an original party is s u m m o n ^ 
under th€ provisions of Rule 14; and a third party, answer,, if a third party 
cqmplaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that'the court 
may or4er a reply to an answer or a third p^rty answer. 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall7 bVb^ motion 
which, uniess made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court' 
comjnfesioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motiow^shall b8 
in* writftig and state succinctly 2nd with particularity the relief sought ^nd5the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(c) Memoranda. 
56 
RJIEADiNGSj MOTIONS, & ORDERS Rufet3 
(cXlX Mpmofsmda?required[> exception!*, filing timfa All jpotio;ns,> except im-
Gpnt£sted,Q$ ex parte nlofions^sbalLbe a&CompapiecLby a supportingjm^motaQr 
dumio Within„teji days after service of the motion jind supporting 'mentfftjBO* 
d u m ^ a ' p a ^ opposing the^'jnotjon shall Bte a memorandum^ in opposition, 
Withpa five^days after s^rvibe^f $hk memorandum in oppositions jh^moying 
party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited tfagebitftfll- of 
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will 
be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to 
fts' mitial'niemorahdtf m. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exqeed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court Reply memoranda'stjall hot exceed. 5^  pages of 
argument without leave of the .court. The coun may permit a party to file an 
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good 
cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) .A memorandum ^tippontmg a motion ft>j? summary, judgment shaft 
coiitain a statement of material fectsas to which} the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists Each fafct shall be separately stated and numbered apd 
supposed bjj citation tQ^relevajiJ materials such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Eacft faet s#t fcftfe in the movjftg party's .memorandum 'is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party 
(c)(3)(B)* A* memorandum opposing a motion.fprt summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving parley's, facts4 that is 
controverted, and may ,cqptain a separate statement of additional, facis in 
dispute. For eacji ot!the moving party's facts that is controverted^ the opposjhjg 
party shall provide an explanation Qf th^ grounds for any dispute, supporteVTBy 
citation^ tp relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery matepals, For 
any additional facts set forth in tKe opposing memorandum, eaqK fact shall 1>e 
separately stated
 {and numbered and supportea by citation to supporting mate-
rials'! such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a table of authorities wi$Kj>age references. 
<c)(3)(D) A party'may *attac$f*as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits br discovery materi-
als. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing, is complete* either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date oirwhifcH ihi fnotiBh^&s'&rved?*tfie date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the datfe the repty memorandum/ if any, wits 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested,
 t l ino parrg Jil^ k a.requfe&t 
the motion will not be submitted for decision 
(e) Hearings. The court may^hold'a'hearmg on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, inra memorandum or in the request to submit 
57 
Rufc? R15LES CBP CIVIL P R O C E D U R E 
for-decisftiii. A request f o r b e a r i n g shall be'separately identified in the capt ion 
of the dodumerit containing the request. The fcourtf'shall grant & rgenifcstfcra 
h i r i n g oft; a motfbn under Rule 56v ok a motioff that w o u l d dispdsfe ofrth& 
action or*any claifti or defense in the actioitf'uftless*the court fiftds that ' the 
mot ion or opposit ion tb the mot ion i s fnvolousor^the i s sue has bekn authorita-
tively decided: 
(t) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including £ minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a judgment . An order fpr the payment of 
money may be enforced in the same ihahner as j f it "were a judgment . Exqept 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order rnadfe wi thout not ice to*the 
adverse party may be vacated or modi f i ed by the judge w h o made* i t w i th or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipula-
tion, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with a n initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by thfe'Court* the prevail ing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision^ serve upon the other parties 
a proposed order i n conformity with the court's decision. Objections td the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days'^aftep serviced The pdrty prepar-
ing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an object ion 
or upon expiration of the tiing to object. 
(0(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall'bS prepared"3s 
separate documents and shall not incorporate any m^ttfer by ffeference. 
(g) Objection "to court commiss ioner's recommendat ion . A recommendat ion 
of a court commiss ioner is the order of the court until modified by tiie court. lA 
party may^ obfect f o the recommendat ion /by filing ,an objection in the" 'same 
manrier'as filing^ ftiotion within ten days after the recommendat ion is m a 4 e m 
open court or^ if the court commiss ioner takes the 'matter uricjer advisement, 
ten "days after the minute entry df the recommendat ion is'served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same maimer afc resooriding to a mot ion. 
[Amended effective November U2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005.] 
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